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SILENCING CULTURE AND CULTURING SILENCE:
A COMPARATIVE EXPERIENCE OF CENTRIFUGAL
FORCES IN THE ETHNIC STUDIES CURRICULUM
Steven W. Bender*
INTRODUCTION
Using the metaphor of silencing, Professor Margaret Montoya
documents the irrelevance of race, gender, and socio-historical
perspectives both in legal education and, more broadly, in legal
discourse.' Although others have invoked this metaphor, Professor
Montoya's charting of the physical, rather than merely metaphori-
cal, space of silence moves beyond this legal literature in several
respects. Viewing silence not just as dead space, Professor Montoya
enlivens and colors silence and other nonverbal aspects of com-
munication as positive cultural traits. She demonstrates how
silence can be used as a pedagogical tool (a centrifugal force) in
the classroom and in client interviews to bring out the voices of
women and of men of color.3 Moreover, Professor Montoya docu-
ments how silence and nonverbal communication, rich with
cultural meaning, are misread to the legal detriment of the
(non)speaker and others dependent on cross-cultural understand-
ing.4 My own experiences in the classroom, an Ethnic Studies
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Oregon School of Law. B.S. 1982, Univer-
sity of Oregon; J.D. 1985, University of Oregon School of Law. Keith Aoki, as always, and
Rennard Strickland made helpful suggestions to this Commentary.
1. See Margaret E. Montoya, Silence and Silencing: Their Centripetal and Centrifugal Forces
in Legal Communication, Pedagogy and Discourse, 5 MICH.J. RACE & L. 847 passim (2000), 33 U.
MICH.J.L. REFORM 263 passim (2000).
2. See, e.g., Keith Aoki, Introduction: Language Is a Virus, 53 U. MIAMI L. REv. 961, 968
(1999); Margaret (H.R.) Chon, On the Need for Asian American Narratives in Law: Ethnic Speci-
mens, Native Informants, Storytelling and Silences, 3 UCLA AsIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 4, 11 (1995);
Yvonne A. Tamayo, Literal Silencing/Silenciando la Lengua, 53 U. MIAMI L. REv. 995, 995-1001
(1999).
3. See Montoya, supra note 1, at 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. at 884-89, 33 U. MICH. J.L. RE-
FORM at 300-05.
4. See id. at 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. at 873-79, 33 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM at 289-95; see,
e.g., Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 372 (1991) (upholding rejection of Latino/a
jurors in Latino defendant's trial for attempted murder where the prosecutor exercised
peremptory challenges based on his culturally limited interpretation of Latino/a de-
meanor).
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classroom filled with students intent on the study and progressive
practice of law, validate many of Professor Montoya's experiences
and observations.
In Part I, I discuss my own experiences with respect to silence
and race in an Ethnic Studies classroom. In Part II, I address the
challenges my undergraduate students face in their journey to be-
come progressive lawyers. In Part III, I examine some of the
doctrinal pitfalls encountered by new lawyers aspiring to use the
law as a mechanism for achieving social justice. Finally, I conclude
by discussing the apparent irrelevance of Latino/a perspectives in
legal education.
I. SILENCE AND RACE FROM AN ETHNIC STUDIES PERSPECTIVE
Professor Montoya posits that failure to acknowledge racial is-
sues in the law school classroom, and in traditional legal discourse
produces a centripetal force that maintains white privilege. In
contrast, a few years ago I designed an undergraduate course, Chi-
canos/as and the Law, in the Ethnic Studies curriculum which uses
race as the means of introducing students to legal education.6 I was
moved in part by a concern that the sole undergraduate offering
by our law school, Perspectives on the Law, was not situated to at-
tract or to intrigue undergraduates of color. Particularly, I had in
mind Chicano/a students in the Movimiento Estudiantil Chicano
de Aztlan (MEChA) organization for which I served as a faculty
advisor. I believed that a course focused on race, especially on is-
sues outside the Black-White paradigm of race discourse, would
5. See Montoya, supra note 1, at 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. at 879-905, 33 U. MICH. J.L. RE-
FORM at 295-321.
6. 1 have offered the course in 1995, 1996, 1997, 1999 and 2000. Latinos/as com-
prised the majority of the students in at least the first two offerings. Progressive white
students, particularly women, have displaced Latinos/as as the dominant group that en-
rolled in the class in the last two course offerings. Typically there are a few Asian American
and African American students as well.
7. In 1993, the University of Oregon's course description for "Perspectives on the
Law" described five thematic segments: (1) law as a grievance-remedial instrument, (2) law
as a penal-corrective instrument, (3) law as an administrative-regulatory instrument, (4) law
as an instrument for organizing conferral of public benefits, and (5) law as an instrument
for facilitating private arrangements. The course was team-taught by five law faculty mem-
bers including one woman but no faculty of color.
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serve as a catalyst to interest these students in the study and prac-
tice of law.8
Since I began teaching Chicanos/as and the Law in 1995, I
have used language discrimination as the decentralizing theme
(in Professor Montoya's phrasing, as a centrifugal force) for the
class. I survey the field of American law using three dimensions
of language law and policy that serve to silence the Spanish-
speaker's culture: Official English and English-only laws 9 that
govern public speech, English-ability laws and policies, 10 and
private language vigilantism." Language law enables me to in-
troduce areas of first-year legal curriculum as diverse as torts,12
criminal law, property, 14 civil procedure,
15 constitutional law, 6
8. My colleague, Keith Aoki, had taught a similar class in 1994 focusing on Asian
Americans, "Asian Americans in U.S. Law & Culture," which he described in his article,
Keith Aoki, Critical Legal Studies, Asian Americans in U.S. Law & Culture, Neil Gotanda, and Me,
4 ASIAN LJ. 19 (1997).
9. "Official English" laws are those designating English as the official state language,
whereas "English-only" laws move beyond such symbolism in expressly prohibiting govern-
ment speech in languages other than English. Several state laws fall somewhere in between,
such as by purporting to preserve and protect the English language and by creating a pri-
vate enforcement mechanism. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. III, § 6 (2000).
10. By "English-ability," I mean to describe laws and policies that withhold benefits or
privileges from, or otherwise impose sanctions on, non-English-speaking persons. An exam-
ple is a state requirement of proficiency in English as a condition to issuing a driver's
license. In a future article, I will identify this trend in legislation, case law, and private action
toward requiring English ability as far more punitive than Official English law.
11. See generally Steven W. Bender, Direct Democracy and Distrust: The Relationship Between
Language Law Rhetoric and the Language Vigilantism Experience, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REv. 145
(1997) (identifying the causal link between state Official-English laws and private attacks on
non-government speech).
12. See Ramirez v. Plough, Inc., 863 P.2d 167, 178 (Cal. 1993) (holding drug manufac-
turer had no duty in tort to warn in Spanish of product risks).
13. See discussion of the trial of Santiago Ventura Morales infta notes 30-42 and ac-
companying text.
14. See Howard Mintz, English-only Policy for Tenants Upheld, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS,
Dec. 10, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, San Jose Mercury News File (reporting that
a California jury had concluded a landlord's English language policy did not violate federal
housing discrimination law).
15. Among other introductions to the process of litigation, my students examine a le-
gal complaint filed in 1990 in an Oregon circuit court against a tavern that enforced its
English-only rule against three Latina patrons. See Portillo v. Howdy Pardner, Inc., No. 16-
90-08274 (Or. Cir. Ct. Lane County filed Sept. 19, 1990).
16. See Guerrero v. Carleson, 512 P.2d 833, 839 (Cal. 1973) (stating that due process
does not compel state agency to provide notice in Spanish to non-English-speaking recipi-
ents of reduction or termination of welfare benefits); see also Flores v. State, 904 S.W.2d 129,
131 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (holding equal protection not denied to defendant sentenced
to prison for want of a Spanish language alcohol diversion program comparable to pro-
grams available for English-speaking defendants).
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and contracts.'7 Study of language law also previews more ad-
vanced legal curriculum, such as First Amendment,'8 labor law and
'20
employment discrimination,' 9 environmental law,0 criminal pro-
cedure,21 and family law.22 Of course, language law is also an
appropriate means of introducing students to race-apparent
courses of legal study such as immigration law and civil rights. My
point is that traditional courses of study in legal education-where
race is often silenced-can be effectively introduced and taught
through race-apparent themes such as language discrimination.
Language law also serves to illustrate the structure and process
of the American legal system. Using the litigation that nullified
Arizona's English-only constitutional provision allows me to ex-
pose students to the core constitutional concept of supremacy, to
the structure of the judicial system and rights to appeal, and to the
process in some states of adopting laws by citizen initiative. In ex
amining the legal challenges to oppression of Latinos/as by means
of language law and policy2 4 in governmental and private settings
17. See, e.g., Steven W. Bender, Consumer Protection for Latinos: Overcoming Language
Fraud and English-Only in the Marketplace, 45 Am. U. L. REv. 1027 (1996) (examining unfair-
ness in contracts between merchants and non-English-speaking consumers).
18. See Ruiz v. Hull, 957 P.2d 984, 1000 (Ariz. 1998) (holding Arizona's English-only
constitutional amendment infringed on multiple First Amendment interests of the public,
public employees, and elected officials).
19. See Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1490 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding the
employer did not violate civil rights of bilingual employees in requiring them to speak only
English on the job).
20. See Luke W. Cole, The Struggle of Kettleman City: Lessons for the Movement, 5 Mo. J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUEs 67, 74-75 (1993-94) (describing examples in struggle to prevent
siting of toxic waste incinerator that link language discrimination to environmental racism).
21. See United States ex rel. Negron v. New York, 434 F.2d 386, 389-90 (2d Cir. 1970)
(holding constitutional right to confront adverse witnesses compels appointment of inter-
preter in criminal trial at state expense).
22. See Sam H. Verhovek, Mother Scolded by Judge for Speaking in Spanish, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 30, 1995, at A12 (reporting that Texas judge had instructed a bilingual mother in a
child custody proceeding that she was abusing her five-year-old daughter by speaking to her
only in Spanish).
23. See ARiz. CONST. art. XXVIII, invalidated by Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official Eng-
lish, 69 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied sub nom., Arizonans for Official English v.
Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 (1997) (finding plaintiffs resignation from state employment ren-
dered case moot); see also Ruiz v. Hull, 957 P.2d 984 (Ariz. 1998). Enacted in 1988 by
initiative, § 3(2) of Arizona's constitutional provision prohibiting non-English languages in
government speech provided for exceptions that included those necessary to protect the
rights of criminal defendants (e.g., Negron), provide bilingual education to the extent re-
quired under federal law, and comply with other federal laws. See, e.g., Voting Rights Act, 42
U.S.C. § 1973aa-la (1994).
24. My emphasis in teaching language law and policy is on the silencing of Spanish
and the consequent oppression of Latinos/as. Our study, however, necessarily exposes the
potential for oppression of other subordinated groups by means of language policy. For
example, my students study accent discrimination in the workplace, an offshoot of English-
[VOL. 5:913
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such as workplaces and the consumer marketplace, I am able to
highlight the diverse sources of American law from statutory25 to
26O
administrative' 6 to constitutional27 and common law. 8
Our classroom study of language, cultural, and race discrimina-
tion in the criminal justice system, as illustrated by the wrongful
murder conviction of Santiago Ventura Morales in 1986, brings
out many of the dimensions of silence and silencing that Professor
Montoya documents. As an eighteen-year-old Mixtec immigrant
from Oaxaca, Mexico, Santiago 9 was found guilty of stabbing a fel-
low migrant worker in the strawberry fields outside Portland,
only policies, that often targets Asian-Americans. See Fragente v. City & County of Honolulu,
888 F.2d 591, 594 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that Filipino man was not discriminated against
when denied position because of his "heavy accent"); see generally Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of
America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law and aJurisdiction for the Last Construction, 100 YALE L.J.
1329 (1991). In California, particularly, the English-only movement is aimed at both Span-
ish speakers and Asian immigrants. See Robert S. Chang & Keith Aoki, Centering the
Immigrant in the Inter/National Imagination, 85 CAL. L. REv. 1395, 1425 (1998) (discussing
language tensions in Monterey Park in the 1980s); see generally Grace A. Pasigan, Sign Lan-
guage: Colonialism and the Battle Over Text, 17 Loy. L.A. ENT. L.J. 625 (1997) (examining
English-only efforts on the East Coast directed at Asian Americans).
Language politics implicate other subordinated groups. For a discussion of the "Ebonics"
controversy surrounding the recognition of Black-English in public education, see Richard
Lee Colvin, No "Ebonics" in New Oakland School Plan, L.A. TIMES, May 6, 1997, at Al, as well as
the impact of English-only law and policy on the indigenous languages of Native cultures,
see Larry Campbell, Dispatch Alaska: More Native Villages Reject English-only Rule, ANCHORAGE
DAILY NEWS, Jan. 24, 1999, at B7. See generally Allison M. Dussias, Waging War with Words:
Native Americans' Continuing Struggle Against the Suppression of Their Languages, 60 OHIO ST.
L.J. 901, 991 (1999) (discussing history of English-only policy and current struggles against
such policy).
25. The federal Civil Rights Acts, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982 (1994), have been invoked
in litigation seeking redress from enforcement of English-only policies by restaurants and
taverns against Spanish-speaking patrons. See Bender, supra note 11, at 170-72. Similarly, the
federal Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1994), has been used to target similar policies
by residential landlords. See Mintz, supra note 14.
26. For example, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Guidelines create a
presumption that employer English-only rules constitute national origin discrimination
under Title VII. See EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of National Origin, 29
C.F.R. § 1606.7(a) (2000), rejected in Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1489 (9th Cir.
1993) (refusing to presume that an English-only policy has a disparate impact on employ-
ees).
27. See generally Ruiz v. Hull, 957 P.2d 984 (Ariz. 1998); Guerrero v. Carleson, 512 P.2d
833 (Cal. 1973); Flores v. State, 904 S.W.2d 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). The federal consti-
tutional doctrines of due process, equal protection, and free speech are employed routinely
in challenges to government policies that target non-English-speaking persons.
28. See Ramirez v. Plough, Inc., 863 P.2d 167, 178 (Cal. 1993) (applying negligence
law to conclude there was no duty to warn non-English-speaking consumers in Spanish of
product dangers); Bender, supra note 17, at 1095-1103 (arguing that certain language poli-
cies of merchants in the consumer marketplace are subject to attack using common law
doctrines such as fraud and unconscionability).
29. I use Santiago's first name as a short-form reference in subsequent text so as not to
elide his paternal or maternal surname in the discussion of his culture.
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Oregon. s" Santiago was singled out quickly as the murder suspect
when he stuttered and would not look a police officer in the eye
during questioning.3' Rather than serving as a guilt reflex, as pre-
sumed by the white police officer, Santiago's inability to convey an
Americanized demeanor of innocence reflected his cultural up-
bringing in which young Mixtecs do not look their elders in the
eye." At trial, his defense was marred by the assumption that Santi-
ago and the migrant witnesses understood Spanish.3 In fact, their
primary language was Mixtec, and Santiago and the witnesses had
trouble understanding the Spanish interpreter provided by the
state.34 One juror viewed this judicial circus of witness misunder-
standings and confused testimony as part of a criminal enterprise in
which "[t]hey all acted kind of guilty."35 Indeed, one of the jurors
remarked later that "[w]e don't need so many of 'em [Mexican mi-
30. See Peter Carlin, What Becomes of the Resurrected, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1992,
(Magazine), at 20.
31. See id.; see also A Trial of Errors (KGW-TV Portland news documentary, Sept. 5,
1990) (reporting remarks of investigating police officer Tim Skipper that "[i]f they hesitate
to look you in the eye.., or they stutter when they speak to you [they are guilty].").
32. See Paul J. DeMuniz, Introduction to IMMIGRANTS IN COURT 3, 5 (Joanne I. Moore
ed., 1999). The prosecutor in Hernandez explained his peremptory challenges against the
Latino/ajurors as based in part on their lack of eye contact in responding to whether they
could ignore deviations between the interpreter's translation and the testimony. See Her-
nandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 357 n.1 (1991). Cf Montoya, supra note 1, at 5 MICH. J.
RACE & L. at 874, 33 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM at 290 ("Indeed, I think the prosecutor did not
know enough about nonverbal communication, particularly cross-cultural communication,
to understand that silence, pauses, and hesitations are encoded with meaning in relation to
the words and the language being spoken.");Juan F. Perea, Hernandez v. New York: Courts,
Prosecutors, and the Fear of Spanish, 21 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1, 60 (1992) (suggesting that in the
cultural context, looking away from the prosecutor may have been an expression of respect
for him or of discomfort in the unfamiliar proceedings); see generally Richard W. Cole &
Laura Maslow-Armand, The Role of Counsel and the Courts in Addressing Foreign Language and
Cultural Barriers at Different Stages of a Criminal Proceeding, 19 W. NEW ENG. L. REa. 193, 226
(1997) (giving examples of cultural explanations for failing to express remorse verbally and
non-verbally).
33. See DeMuniz, supra note 32, at 3-5.
34. See Carlin, supra note 30, at 20 (reporting that the investigating officer dismissed
the distinction between languages because Spanish and indigenous languages "go hand-in-
hand in Mexican country down there"); Barnes C. Ellis, Ventura Murder Case Dropped,
OREGONIAN, Apr. 12, 1991, at A2, A18 (noting contention of anthropologist that Santiago
understood only enough Spanish to buy vegetables in the marketplace); see also Sandra
Sanchez, Misdiagnosed Patient Freed After 2 Years, USA TODAY, June 17, 1992, at 3A
(describing release from Oregon mental hospital of Mexican migrant worker wrongly diag-
nosed two years previously as a paranoid schizophrenic for speaking in tongues when
doctors assumed he spoke Spanish and patient in fact spoke the indigenous dialect of Tri-
que).
Prompted by the experience in Santiago's case, Oregon ultimately passed legislation re-
quiring interpreters to be tested and certified. See Oregon Mandates Testing for Court
Interpreters, OREGONIAN, Dec. 26, 1995, at B4.
35. Carlin, supra note 30, at 20.
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grant workers] running around here." 6 Further, Santiago's public
defender decided unilaterally that Santiago could not testify in his
own defense, 7 leading at least one juror to assume incorrectly that
"he had a long criminal history."3 When the guilty verdict was an-
nounced, Santiago broke his involuntary silence and began howling
in what his public defender described as "horrible sorrow."39 Captur-
ing the jurors' reaction to hearing his voice for the first time,
Santiago said later "[t] hey realized I was a human then., 40 When sev-
eral jurors concluded shortly thereafter that they had succumbed to
group dynamics and made the wrong decision, they began a five-
year struggle along with local activists that culminated in a successful
petition for post-conviction relief that freed Santiago.4'
II. DECULTURING FORCES IN LEGAL EDUCATION
I tell my students that after his release from prison, Santiago
declared his interest in becoming a lawyer to fight injustice. 42 No
doubt, many of them have the same noble intention. Professor
Montoya soundly indicts the deculturing forces in legal education
that shift these students away from a commitment to progressive
lawyering for social change to the pursuit of a career with
36. Id. As best as I can determine, the Santiago jury was all-white. Of course, under the
outcome in Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991), the prosecutor could have validly
used her peremptory challenges to exclude bilingual Latinos from this jury if she had per-
ceived they would be unable to ignore the testimony of the witnesses in Spanish.
37. See A Trial of Errors, supra note 31 ("My attorney never told me that I had the right
to testi4'.").
38. Id. (quotingjuror Patty Lee).
39. Id.
40. Id. Without meaning to detract from the gravity of Santiago's experience and
emotion upon being sentenced to life in prison, I wonder whether, when law students of
color speak out in the classroom after a long silence, their white professors and classmates
are similarly moved to realize their competency. Cf Margaret E. Montoya, Mascaras, Trenzas,
y Grehas: Un/Masking the Self While Un/Braiding Latina Stories and Legal Discourse, 17 HARV.
WOMEN's L.J. 185 (1994) (describing personal experience of breaking silence to question
the socio-economic and cultural backdrop of a manslaughter case involving a Latina defen-
dant).
41. See Carlin, supra note 30, at 20 (noting the ruling in Santiago's favor was based on
the denial of his constitutional right to testify and on the failure of his defense counsel to
call any expert witnesses in his defense); see also DeMuniz, supra note 32, at 5 (revealing that
a private reinvestigation of the case established convincingly that another migrant laborer
had committed the murder). Having learned English while imprisoned, Santiago obtained
a college degree in social work and now works for the California Rural Legal Assistance
Foundation.
42. See Spencer Heinz, Morales Enrolls in College, 'Takes Look at Career in Law, OPREGO-
NIAN,Jan. 21, 1992, at C8.
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conservative law firms in partnership with corporate America.
Professor Montoya's focus on the silencing of race and gender in the
law school classroom as the culprit for this "pernicious" change leads
me to question whether my own focus on race and culture makes
the false promise to my students of the relevance of race in legal
education. Surely the undergraduate Ethnic Studies major,
immersed in a curriculum rich with socio-historical perspectives,4
will be confused, intimidated, and ultimately silenced by the
apparent irrelevance of this background in legal discourse. By
contrast, I imagine those law students steeped in the language of
economics and business in their undergraduate careers may find a
more tradeable currency in the law classroom. 5
Of equal concern, I wonder whether Professor Montoya's focus
on the deculturing of the classroom is too narrow. Race is silenced
long before and well after the hegemony of the law school class-
room. I worry about my Latino/a students' performance on the
standardized law admissions test. Will the dismantling of affirma-
43. In the same vein, my presence in the undergraduate classroom as a law professor
of color may give the deceptive impression that Latino/a law professors are plentiful in
number. Not only am I the only Latino/a law professor at my school, but it is also likely that,
given my German father's surname, few of my law students are aware that I identify myself as
Latino. Generally, I find that my teaching areas of Real Estate Planning, Secured Land
Transactions, Commercial Law, and Corporations are oriented toward the dominant cul-
ture and provide students with no clues as to my cultural identity. Thus far, I have had no
opportunity to teach Chicanos/as and the Law in the law school curriculum. The irrele-
vance and eliding of race in the law school classroom, as documented by Professor
Montoya, supra note 1, at 5 MICH.J. RACE & L. at 891-904, 33 U. MICH.J.L. REFoRM at 307-
20, helps mask my own identity as a Latino law professor from my law students.
44. See generally Kevin R. Johnson & George A. Martinez, Crossover Dreams: The Roots of
LatCrit Theory in Chicana/o Studies Activism and Scholarship, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1143 (1999)
(examining the roots of Chicana/o Studies and its links to LatCrit theory). As part of our
discussion of English-only laws, my students read amicus briefs filed with the Supreme
Court in the Yniguez litigation, see discussion supra note 23, by the State of New Mexico,
describing the history of government acceptance of Spanish there, and by the Hawaii Civil
Rights Commission, detailing the role of early English language law and policy in the deni-
gration of Hawaiian culture. Later, when we address ill-conceived laws aimed at immigrants,
particularly those from Mexico, my students read about the history of the abuse of Mexican
migrant laborers. See generally Gilbert Paul Carrasco, Latinos in the United States: Invitation and
Exile, in IMMIGRANTS OUT! THE NEW NATIVISM AND THE ANTI-IMMIGRANT IMPULSE IN THE
UNITED STATES 190 (Juan F. Perea ed., 1997).
45. See Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Foreword: Identity, Democracy, Communicative Power, In-
ter/National Labor Rights and the Evolution of LatCrit Theory and Community, 53 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 575, 655-56 (1999) (describing the professional and academic reward system for flu-
ency in law and economics in contrast to critical frameworks of outsider jurisprudence such
as LatCrit); Jean Stefancic, Needles in the Haystack: Finding New Legal Movements in Casebooks,
73 CHI-KENT L. REV. 755, 762 (1998) (stating that anecdotal evidence suggests that more
law students today have backgrounds in economic theory than a grounding in ethnic or
race studies).
[VOL. 5:913
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tive action,46 part of the broader effort to silence race in legal and
higher education, enhance the role of this often culturally inap-
propriate device?47 How culturally appropriate are American law
schools where student rankings and self-worth are derived from a
twice annual "sit and spill" examination?" Are bar examinations
that regulate entry into the profession in an even more rigorous
session of endurance and speed any better suited to the culture of
students of color? Moreover, assuming that students survive this
deculturing gauntlet with their public interest commitment intact,
will spiraling debt loads steer them away from often underpaid
opportunities in progressive lawyering?" Surely, the journey from
46. See, e.g., Proposition 209, enacted as CAL. CONST. art I, § 31; Hopwood v. Texas, 78
F.3d 932, 955 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding University of Texas School of Law may not use race
as a factor in admissions).
47. See generally Leslie G. Espinoza, The LSAT: Narratives and Bias, 1 Am. U. J. GENDER
& L. 121 (1993) (arguing that, despite recent efforts to make the Law School Admission
Test (LSAT) more inclusive of diverse groups, the test perpetuates bias and disadvantages
minority and women applicants to law schools).
48. Dean Rennard Strickland contributed to this Article the following account of the
cultural inadequacy of most law school examinations from a Cherokee perspective:
The story is one that happened to me while I was working on the infamous Girl Scout
Murder case in which a Cherokee had been charged with the murder. After the ac-
cused James Leroy Hart had been found not guilty, the state decided to charge the
religious leader of the Keetoowah traditional Cherokee religious group with harbor-
ing a fugitive for having granted him sanctuary (which is a little bit like benefit of
clergy in Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence). One of the young Indian men who was work-
ing with us was absolutely brilliant and seemed to know and understand every legal
doctrine any of us would mention. I finally told him that I thought he ought to go to
law school. He reported that he had and that he had flunked out. This didn't make
sense to me because his analysis and knowledge were simply superb. It finally came
to me that he was a very traditional Cherokee who had been raised in a family with
strong tribal values. In such a society, the wise and good citizen does not make rapid
decisions but reviews and re-reviews all issues. It is not thought "wise" or "smart" or
"fair" to answer complex questions quickly. The good man and good woman gives
the question the time it is worth. In law school (and on much of the bar), we too of-
ten test how quickly one can answer a question. We ask our Native students (like all
other students) to list the thirty-seven crimes in a fact situation in a fifteen minute
question. The method of testing runs exactly counter to what is taught in most tradi-
tional American Indian cultures. This creates a very difficult situation in which even
those students who survive are not showing on the tests what they have learned or
how they can apply the knowledge.
E-mail from Dean Rennard Strickland, Dean and Philip H. Knight Professor, University of
Oregon School of Law, to Steven W. Bender, Associate Professor of Law, University of Ore-
gon School of Law (May 1, 2000) (on file with author).
49. See Michael A. Olivas, Paying for a Law Degree: Trends in Student Borrowing and the
Ability to Repay Debt, 49J. LEGAL EDuc. 333 (1999) (documenting a dramatic increase in the
cost of legal education).
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an Ethnic Studies education to what Gerald L6pez describes as a
rebellious lawyer' is a perilous one.
III. DOCTRINAL PITFALLS TO PROGRESSIVE LAWYERING
What awaits the now-graduated progressive lawyer who aspires to
use law as a means of achieving and ensuring social justice? She
will find a legal wasteland marked by the increasing conservatism
of judges in construing statutes and reigning in common law theo-
ries;5' the chilling of civil rights actions through "tort reform"
measures that reciprocate attorney fee recoveries, eliminate or re-
strict punitive damage recoveries, and limit class actions; 2 and the
dismantling of statutory guarantees originating in the Civil Rights
53
era in what is now called the post-Civil Rights era.
On reflection, my undergraduate students ought to see some of
this spirit-breaking writing on the wall. Many, if not most, of the
language cases they study foretell the doctrinal pitfalls of progres-
sive lawyering for civil rights on behalf of Latinos and Latinas.
They learn the difficulty in bridging the judicial and definitional
divide between language discrimination and unlawful discrimina-
tion on the basis of race or national origin.54 They observe how
easily a defendant can elude liability for purposeful discrimination
under civil rights laws by asserting some pretextual business pur-
pose-for example, that a tavern's English-only policy keeps the
50. See GERALD P. L6PEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF PROGRES-
SIVE LAW PRACTICE 38 (1992).
51. See, e.g., Ralph James Mooney, The New Conceptualism in Contract Law, 74 OR. L.
REv. 1131, 1170-71 (1995) (identifying in recent contract law decisions a "judicial tilt away
from underdogs, back toward the privileged beneficiaries of classical contract law.").
52. Cf Troy L. Cady, Note, Disadvantaging the Disadvantaged: The Discriminatoy Effects of
Punitive Damage Caps, 25 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1005, 1038-39 (1997) (suggesting the dispropor-
tionate impact of tort reform on the economically disadvantaged).
53. See Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1490 (9th Cir. 1993) (rejecting EEOC
Guidelines designed to facilitate challenges under Tide VII to employer English-only rules).
54. See Flores v. State, 904 S.W.2d 129, 130-31 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (rejecting con-
tention that language discrimination amounts to discrimination based on race or national
origin and affirming denial of probation to defendant because of his inability to speak Eng-
lish); see generally Juan F. Perea, Ethnicity and Prejudice: Reevaluating "National Origin"
Discrimination Under Title VII, 35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 805 (1994) (calling for explicit statu-
tory protection against discrimination on the basis of ethnic traits).
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peace in the bar,5 5 or that a landlord's policy to reject non-English
speaking applicants is meant to ensure effective communication as
to the condition of the premises.56 They are exposed to the ten-
dency of courts to defer to the legislature on issues of language
policy, and learn, of course, that where the legislature has failed to
create positive language rights, the claim to establish such rights
under the common law is doomed.57 In studying the Supreme
Court's refusal to invalidate a prosecutor's use of peremptory chal-
58lenges to exclude bilingual Latinos/as from the jury, students see
the shortcomings of the doctrine of equal protection to guard
against cultural ignorance. In the balancing of detriment and
benefit under the doctrines of due process and equal protection,
they see undue weight given to protecting government from the
cost of providing Spanish services on the mistaken assumption that
extending rights to Spanish-speakers requires recognition of every
other languageY.5 Finally, despite its use in striking down Arizona's
55. See Bender, supra note 11, at 171-72 (describing the successful defense of a Wash-
ington tavern owner whose English-only policy was upheld against a challenge under state
civil ights law because the factfinder concluded the owner was acting to ensure safety of
person and property).
56. See Mintz, supra note 14 (suggesting the basis for a jury's conclusion that the land-
lord's policy did not violate federal housing discrimination law).
57. SeeRamirez v. Plough, Inc., 863 P.2d 167, 178 (Cal. 1993) (refusing to impose tort
duty on aspirin manufacturer to disclose dangers in Spanish because court believed legisla-
ture is the appropriate institution to require such disclosures); Commonwealth v. Olivo, 337
N.E.2d 904, 910 n.6 (Mass. 1975) (arguing that it was improper for court to require transla-
tion of notice to vacate public housing without legislative mandate); Alfonso v. Board of
Review, 444 A.2d 1075, 1077 (N.J. 1982) (leaving the decision of whether to require transla-
tion of unemployment appeal rights to legislature that can better assess the changing needs
and demands of the non-English-speaking population and the government agency).
58. See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 369 (1991).
59. See, e.g., Frontera v. Sindell, 522 F.2d 1215, 1219 (6th Cir. 1975) (stating that to re-
quire Civil Service exams in Spanish would entitle other groups to exams in their language
to the detriment of city taxpayers); Guerrero v. Carleson, 512 P.2d 833, 837-38 (Cal. 1973)
(rejecting constitutional challenge to English-only notice in part-because of concern that
requiring Spanish translation would compel accommodation in other languages); Flores v.
State, 904 S.W.2d 129, 131 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (finding no violation of equal protection
where defendant was denied probation because of lack of adequate Spanish language alco-
hol diversion program and stating that a different outcome would require cash-strapped
governments to establish treatment programs in many languages); see also Bender, supra
note 17, at 1061-62 (questioning the assumption that requiring government to accommo-
date Spanish language necessarily compels accommodation in every language, particularly
given the enormous gap between the number of Spanish-speakers in America and speakers
of other non-English languages). My point is that in gauging the detriment of denying lan-
guage rights, a court should determine the extent of the population affected by an adverse
decision. Particularly with regard to the provision of government translations in Spanish
(e.g., when conducting examinations for licensed occupations), courts might well conclude
that it is reasonable to accommodate only certain languages other than English. In contrast,
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English-only law,6° my students observe the limited reach of the
constitutional guarantee of free speech."
Language law is not unique in its reflection of the deteriorating
conditions for progressive lawyering. Surely other thematic rights-
based approaches to introduce the study of law, such as those
based on gender, class, sexual orientation, immigrant rights, or
racial discrimination, would foretell similar obstacles to social jus-
tice. These pitfalls expose a separate concern from what Professor
Montoya has identified as the curricular avoidance of race in the
law school classroom. Law students are rarely schooled in praxis-
the means of linking legal strategies to community-based political
and social movements for change.62 By contrast, my undergraduate
students learn about the role that these movements play in the
struggle for social justice, a role strong enough that the commu-
nity-based effort on occasion wholly displaces any legal (lawsuit-
63based) response. In the context of language policy, we study the
role of community activism in the withdrawal of plans to site a
toxic waste incinerator near Kettleman City, California.6 Previ-
ously, a judge had thrown out the project's environmental impact
report because it had not been translated into Spanish for the
benefit of the local Spanish-speaking residents.6" However, had it
not been for community resistance measures that undoubtedly in-
fluenced the decision to abandon the project, its proponent could
when a liberty interest is at stake as in Flores, the detriment is so substantial that every lan-
guage should be accommodated in lieu of imprisonment.
60. See Ruiz v. Hull, 957 P.2d 984, 1002 (Ariz. 1998) (holding Arizona's constitutional
amendment infringes free speech interests of the public, public officials, and elected offi-
cials).
61. See California Teachers Ass'n. v. Davis, 64 F. Supp. 2d 945, 953-54 (C.D. Cal. 1999)
(upholding California's bilingual education initiative against challenge by public school
teachers in part because of the state's ability to regulate teachers' speech in the classroom).
62 See generally Francisco Valdes, Poised at the Cusp: LatCrit Theory, Outsider Jurisprudence
and Latinalo SelfEmpowerment, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REv. 1 (1997) (describing the importance
of praxis to LatCrit scholars).
63. See Kevin R. Johnson, Civil Rights and Immigration: Challenges for the Latino Commu-
nity in the Twenty-First Century, 8 LA RAZA L.J. 42, 47 (1995) (observing that litigation alone
has not been very successful historically in promoting social change for Latinos); Kevin R.
Johnson, Lawyeringfor Social Change: What's A Lawyer To Do?, 5 MICH.J. RACE & L. 201, 205
(1999).
64. See Jim Wasserman, Little Town Notches Win Over Big Money, FRESNO BEE, Sept. 9,
1993, at BI available at LEXIS, News Library, Fresno Bee File.
65. See Judge Overturns Approval of Commercial Waste Incinerator, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1992,
at A24 (noting that 40% of the local residents spoke only Spanish).
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have simply translated the report as the court had ordered and
pushed forward with the approval process.6 6
We also study a recent example of activism against hate
speech-a close ally of language discrimination.67 In 1998, while a
federal court in California was still wrestling with constitutional
challenges to the anti-immigrant Proposition 187 adopted four
years earlier, the co-sponsor of that initiative erected a billboard in
the California desert announcing to travelers "Welcome To Cali-
fornia, The Illegal Immigration State. Don't Let This Happen To
Your State."6 Within a few weeks, a Latino activist threatened at
first to burn and later to repaint the billboard to erase its message
of hate directed at immigrants and Latinos/as. Rather than face a
confrontation, the billboard owner returned the vinyl sign to the
anti-immigrant group not two months after its unveiling.69 As
66. See Cole, supra note 20, at 77-79 (addressing the relationship between legal inter-
vention and the larger political movement for environmental justice).
67. See Bender, supra note 11, for discussion of private language vigilantism; cf Eliza-
beth Weise, Goal! Soccer Fans Force AOL To Accept Spanish, ARIz. REPUBLIC,July 26, 1996, at El
(detailing how a mass e-mail protest led to an internet company's reversal of an English-only
rule for its soccer chatroom).
68. See California Billboard Fans Illegal Immigrant Dispute, HOUST. CHRON., May 6, 1998,
at 16A (reporting remarks of California Coalition for Immigration Reform spokesperson
that the billboard serves as a warning about "the devastation that has occurred in California
because of illegal immigration and bilingual education."). California has a long history of
overt hostility, violence, and threats toward immigrants who are perceived as non-white. See
generally TOMAS ALMAGUER, RACIAL FAULT LINES: THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF WHITE SU-
PREMACY IN CALIFORNIA (1994). For examples of this hostility towards Chinese laborers and
Japanese agriculturalists in the late 19th and early 20th Centuries, see Keith Aoki, "Foreign-
Ness" & Asian American Identities: Yellowface, World War 11 Propaganda, and Bfurcated Racial
Stereotypes, 4 UCLA ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 1, 23-33 (1996); Keith Aoki, No Right to Own?: The
Early Twentieth-Century "Alien Land Laws" as a Prelude to Internment, 40 B.C. L. Rv. 37 (1998).
69. See Peter H. King, With Gusto, But No Inferno, Obledo Brought Down "Racist" Billboard,
FRESNO BEE, June 24, 1998, at BI, available at LEXIS, News Library, Fresno Bee File. Appar-
ently the activist, Mario Obledo, had researched vandalism and trespassing laws and had
anticipated his arrest. See id. In a subsequent article, I will discuss whether property-based
doctrines protecting against entry should give way to allow self-help to remove physical
monuments of hate speech.
SUMMER 2000]
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
342 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 33:3
Professor Montoya suggests, hate speech too often prompts silence
rather than individual or community activism] As viewed against
Montoya's indictment of the silencing of race, it is ironic that pro-
ponents of the billboard assailed the activist's tactics as
71intimidation that "squelched" needed public discourse on race.
CONCLUSION
Validating Professor Montoya's observations on the irrelevance
of race and socio-historical perspectives in legal education, no ad-
ministrator has ever suggested that I offer my Chicanos/as and the
Law course to law students. Recently, Professor Frank Valdes at the
University of Miami School of Law conducted an e-mail survey that
confirmed only a handful of U.S. law schools include meaningful
coverage of Latino/a issues in their curricula." As Professor Valdes
concluded, this means that most law students, whether Latino/a or
not, graduate "without EVER having studied about, thought about,
or discussed legal issues that are especially germane to the fastest
growing social group in the country!,73
Today, Latinos/as and their intersection with law and social pol-
icy are relevant only at the ma-gins and fringes of legal education.
The LatCrit enterprise, well represented in this Symposium, is de-
voted to challenging the ongoing silencing of race and to urging
that the legal profession, legal education, and society recognize
the salience of race and of Latinos/as, their culture, and their his-
tory, in our collective future.
70 See Montoya, supra note 1, at 5 MICH.J. RACE & L. at 906,33 U. MICH.J.L. P-FORM
at 322. ("[H]ate speech ... can only be countered by being responded to. Silence in the
face of hate speech makes us all complicit.").
71. See Dan Schnur, Liberals Don't Seem Ready for a Real Conversation on Race, SAN JOSE
MERCURY NEwS,July 12, 1998, at 5F.
72. See e-mail from Frank Valdes, Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law,
to Steven W. Bender, Associate Professor of Law, University of Oregon School of Law (Mar.
29, 2000) (on file with author).
73. Id.
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